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“Imagine There’s No Country”: Statelessness 
as Persecution in Light of Haile II 
STEWART E. FORBES†
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine there’s no countries
It isn’t hard to do
Nothing to kill or die for1 
The twentieth century ended not with John Lennon’s
dream of a stateless utopia, but with the division or
disintegration of many multinational nation-states. The 
geopolitical chaos of the last thirty years left many ethnic,
religious, and racial minorities stateless, either by law (de 
jure statelessness) or by practice (de facto statelessness).2 
When compared to physical forms of persecution like rape 
and torture, statelessness by denationalization3 pales. Yet,
statelessness might have the greatest legal consequences of
any form of persecution. Statelessness deprives the
individual of the basic trappings of the civilized world, often
including the rights to marry, own land, and inherit 
† J.D. Candidate, Class of 2013, SUNY Buffalo Law School; B.A., 2001,
Brigham Young University. Thank you to Professor Stephen Paskey for helping
me refine this idea; to Sylvain whose story this is; and especially to my wife
Carolyn for all her patience, understanding, and support. 
1. JOHN LENNON, IMAGINE (Apple Records 1971). 
2. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Div. of Int’l Prot., UNHCR and De Facto
Statelessness, 5-7, 27, LPPR/2010/01 (Apr. 2010) (by Hugh Massey) [hereinafter
Massey]; see discussion infra Part I (discussing de jure and de facto
statelessness).
3. Denationalization is the process whereby a country deprives a person of
her nationality. This differs from denaturalization, which is the process whereby
a country removes the citizenship of a naturalized citizen. Denationalization
includes, by definition, both denaturalization and stripping natural born
citizens of their citizenship. For the sake of consistency, I will use the term
“denationalize” or “denationalization” throughout this Note. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 499 (9th ed. 2009).
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700 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61
property.4 In a case that focused on the legality of
denationalizing a draft-dodger who fled to Mexico to avoid 
military service, the Supreme Court characterized
American citizenship as “one of the most valuable rights in
the world today.”5 Chief Justice Earl Warren said in Perez v. 
Brownell that “[c]itizenship is man’s basic right for it is
nothing less than the right to have rights.”6 Despite Chief
Justice Warren’s passionate dissent in Perez, American
courts have been loath to build on his view that
denationalization is persecution per se. 7 
Statelessness is anathema to the American ethos. 
Within the context of the American civic-republicanism,
“citizenship” connotes a relationship of mutual obligation
and benefit between the individual and the political
community.8 It represents the relationship between the 
state and its citizens, and the obligation of each side.
Specifically it represents the obligation of the state to work 
on behalf of, and to protect the interests of its citizenry.9 In 
contrast to the protections afforded to citizens, the stateless 
refugee finds herself without these same legal protections 
and completely reliant upon the whims of her host country 
to protect the few rights that state might grant her.10 
4. Brad K. Blitz & Maureen Lynch, Statelessness and the Deprivation of
Nationality, in  STATELESSNESS AND CITIZENSHIP: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON THE
BENEFITS OF NATIONALITY 1-2 (Brad K. Blitz & Maureen Lynch eds., 2011); see
Jay Milbrandt, Stateless, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 75, 93-95 (2011).
5. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 147, 160 (1963) (quoting 
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHEN WE SHALL
WELCOME 235 (1953)). 
6. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
 7. See Belov v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 397 F. App’x 530, 531-32 (11th Cir.
2010); Fedosseeva v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 2007); Paripovic v.
Gonzales, 418 F.3d 240, 242, 244 (3d Cir. 2005). 
8. See J.M. Spectar, To Ban or Not to Ban an American Taliban? Revocation
of Citizenship & Statelessness in a Statecentric System, 39 CAL. W.L. REV. 263,
275 (2003); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 278 (9th ed. 2009). 
9. See Carol A. Batchelor, Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International 
Protection, 7 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 232, 234-35 (1995); Jeffrey L. Blackman, State 
Successions and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an Effective Nationality 
Under International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1141, 1150 (1998); Spectar, supra
note 8, at 271-72.
 10. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958); Batchelor, supra note 9, at












   
 














   
 
2013] STATELESSNESS AS PERSECUTION 701
Because “nationality is the prerequisite for the
realization of other fundamental rights,”11 and because 
“[e]very man has a right to live somewhere on earth,”12 the
international community has devoted much time and 
energy to defining and protecting the rights of the 
stateless.13 The United Nations provides a concise definition 
of “stateless people,” which “means a person who is not
considered as a national by any State under the operation of 
its law.”14 At first blush this may not seem an important
category. Indeed, some post-national theorists—and singers
like John Lennon—might look forward to a day devoid of 
states.15 This blind optimism belies the difficulties faced by 
the stateless. One commentator described the difficulties 
the stateless face in this way: 
Stateless persons may be unable to go to school or university,
work legally, own property, get married or travel. They may find it 
difficult to enter hospital, impossible to open a bank account and 
have no chance of receiving a pension. If someone robs them or
rapes them, they may find they cannot lodge a complaint because
legally they do not exist, and the police require proof that they do
before they can open an investigation.16 
In an earlier generation, Hannah Arendt put it this 
way: “[T]he moment human beings lacked their own
11. Blackman, supra note 9, at 1148.
 12. CATHERYN SECKLER-HUDSON, STATELESSNESS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
THE UNITED STATES 248 (Kraus Reprint Co. 1971) (1934) (quoting Thomas
Jefferson). 
13. See, e.g., Erwin Loewenfeld, Status of Stateless Persons, in 27 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 59, 60 (1962) (discussing the issues of
statelessness in international law up to and including the German Nuremberg 
Law of Nationality); Caroline Sawyer, Stateless in Europe: Legal Aspects of De 
Jure and De Facto Statelessness in the European Union, in STATELESSNESS IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION: DISPLACED, UNDOCUMENTED, UNWANTED 69, 74-81 
(Caroline Sawyer & Brad K. Blitz eds., 2011).
14. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 1, para. 1,
Sept. 28, 1954 [hereinafter The 1954 Convention].
 15. Linda K. Kerber, The Stateless as the Citizen’s Other: A View from the
United States, 112 AM. HIST. REV. 1, 7 (2007).
 16. Laura van Waas, Nationality and Rights, in STATELESSNESS AND
CITIZENSHIP: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON THE BENEFITS OF NATIONALITY 36-37 
(Brad K. Blitz & Maureen Lynch eds., 2011). Milbrandt describes how the
statelessness of women in Thailand is one of the leading causes of sexual
exploitation. Milbrandt, supra note 4, at 77-80.

























    




   
  
 
702 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61
government . . . no authority was left to protect them and no 
institution was willing to guarantee them . . . [what was]
supposedly inalienable.”17 
Understandably, scholars, diplomats, and judges have 
long considered statelessness undesirable;18 however,
modern international law still grants states the right to set
citizenship rules, and to revoke citizenship.19 This power
allows states to divest their citizens of citizenship, or 
“denationalize” them, despite the work of the international 
community to eliminate statelessness.20 In 1930, the issue of 
statelessness was one of the first considered during the
First Conference on the Codification of International Law at
the Hague.21 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
took up the cause with the statement that “everyone has the
right to a nationality.”22 The United Nations created the
office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) in December 1950 to help protect the
rights of refugees who found themselves in a state of de 
facto statelessness.23 Under the auspices of the UNHCR, two 
conventions were concluded to reduce statelessness—the 
United States signed neither.24 The United States felt that,
17. Kerber, supra note 15, at 15 (quoting Hannah Arendt) (internal quotation
marks omitted). 
18. In Trop v. Dulles, Chief Justice Warren’s plurality decision described
denationalization as “a form of punishment more primitive than torture.” 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
19. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Div. of Int’l Prot., UNHCR Action to
Address Statelessness: A Strategy Note, 22 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 297, 299 (2010)
[hereinafter UNHCR Int’l Prot.] (explaining the international legal framework
regarding the loss and acquisition of nationality).
 20. Batchelor, supra note 9, at 235.
 21. Id; see, e.g., Loewenfeld, supra note 13, at 63 (discussing the Hague
Convention and the League of Nations’s efforts to address statelessness).
 22. COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON NATIONALITY, THE AVOIDANCE AND REDUCTION
OF STATELESSNESS: RECOMMENDATION NO. R (99) 18 AND EXPLANATORY
MEMORANDUM 10 (2000) (making recommendations on how E.U. member-states
can reduce statelessness). 
23. About Us, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html (last
visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
24. See, e.g., The 1954 Convention, supra note 14 at art. 1, para. 1 (defining
statelessness as “a person who is not considered as a national by any State


















   
  
 
   
  
 
   
 
 












2013] STATELESSNESS AS PERSECUTION 703
at least in the case of the 1954 Convention, the Convention’s 
obligations to not deport the stateless would encourage the
stateless to come to the United States with the knowledge 
that the United States could not deport them.25 
The conflict between the goals of the international 
system and the nation-state’s right to define its own rules 
for citizenship finds expression in the American refugee
system. The United States refugee system is designed to
protect those who have suffered persecution in their native
countries, or, if stateless, in the country of their last
habitual residence.26 Despite Chief Justice Warren’s
warning that the stateless suffered from “a form of
punishment more primitive than torture,”27 historically,
United States courts have not felt that the stateless 
suffered persecution worthy of receiving asylum.28 Unless
the asylum applicant can show persecution fitting one of the
to these stateless individuals); Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,
Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 [hereinafter The 1961 Convention] (requiring
signatories to grant citizenship rights to children born in their territories or
born to their nationals when in another country). For an in-depth discussion of
the 1954 Convention, see Paul Weis, The Convention Relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons, 10 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 255 (1961). Weis also provided an in-
depth discussion of the 1961 Convention. See Paul Weis, The United Nations 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961, 11 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1073,
1080-81 (1962) [hereinafter Weis, 1961 Convention].
 25. Kerber, supra note 15, at 9.
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006). The idea that states can use the “last 
habitual residence” of the refugee as the locus for the review originates with the
1951 U.N. Refugee Convention. See Kate Darling, Protection of Stateless Persons 
in International Asylum and Refugee Law, 21 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 742, 751
(2009).
27. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
28. See, e.g., Fedosseeva v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 2007)
(finding that statelessness is insufficient to justify asylum); Al-Fara v. Gonzales,
404 F.3d 733, 739 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the applicant’s experience with 
Israeli authorities constituted discrimination, not persecution required by the
statute); De Souza v. INS, 999 F.2d 1156, 1159 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that
states have the right to determine their citizenry and that persecution does not
stem from a refusal to grant citizenship). But see Stserba v. Holder, 646 F.3d
964, 975 (6th Cir. 2011) (stating that if the denationalization is ethnically
motivated, then denationalization may be persecution per se even absent other
more overt forms of persecution). 
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statutorily defined categories,29 the courts often return the
stateless applicant to the country of their last habitual 
residence.30 This merely exacerbates the “Kafkaesque legal 
vacuum” that the stateless must face and runs contrary to
some international norms.31 
The political fragmentation and emergence of new 
states in the last few decades of the twentieth century
exacerbated and augmented the problem of the stateless.32 
During this time, millions moved into refugee camps and
were rendered stateless through government action.33 
Despite this, American courts did not change their reading 
of United States refugee law and continued to return 
stateless refugees to the country in which they last resided. 
Often the courts returned the refugee to the country in
which her refugee camp was located.34 The courts often
viewed these camps, and the countries in which they were 
located, as the “last habitual residence” of the refugees. 
When courts did grant asylum for stateless refugees, they
ignored the applicant’s statelessness and based the grant of 
asylum on some other outward manifestation of
persecution.35 
Given this background, the 2010 holding in Haile v. 
Holder  (Haile II)36 that divestiture of citizenship may
constitute persecution and thus make the stateless refugee
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) (stating that asylum applicants must show
“a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”).
 30. See Paripovic v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 240, 245-46 (3d Cir. 2005).
 31. See Kerber, supra note 15, at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
 32. See Massey, supra note 2, at 27; REGINA GERMAIN, AILA’s ASYLUM
PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 23-24 (2d ed. 
2000).
 33. See Kerber, supra note 15, at 19. 
34. Paripovic, 418 F.3d at 245-46 (holding that a Croatian-born ethnic Serb
could be deported to Serbia where he resided in a refugee camp during the
Serbo-Croat war); see also Sarah B. Fenn, Note, Paripovic v. Gonzales: Defining 
Last Habitual Residence for Stateless Asylum Applicants, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1545, 1563-66 (2007) (describing in detail the persecution faced by stateless
refugees); cf. Blitz & Lynch, supra note 4, at 7 (discussing the arbitrary 
deprivation of citizenship). 
35. See, e.g., Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 453-54 (6th Cir 2003).






























    
2013] STATELESSNESS AS PERSECUTION 705
asylum-worthy, is highly unusual.37 Judge Posner’s decision 
in Haile II equates at least some types of statelessness,
statelessness springing from denationalization, with
persecution for the first time in an asylum case.38 This 
stands at odds with the history of American ambivalence
toward the plight of the foreign stateless.39 Although this
ruling will not open the floodgates to the world’s stateless, 
its unique position as the first case to equate statelessness 
to persecution makes it worthy of analysis.40 
In this Note, I will explain the significance of this case. I
will explore the international norms and legal theories
behind citizenship, and how individuals become stateless. I
will outline the significant legal vulnerabilities the stateless 
experience. I will explain how the United States treats 
stateless refugees: how the United States statutory
construction requires asylum applicants to prove they have 
experienced persecution; how the case law has interpreted
these statutes; and how courts have consistently rejected 
the idea of statelessness as per se persecution. Into this
background, I will show how the holdings in Haile I and II
expand the definition of persecution to include the
withdrawal of citizenship in certain circumstances. I will 
conclude by discussing the implications of this case for 
stateless asylum seekers in the United States, and how this
ruling brings United States jurisprudence more in line with 
Supreme Court rulings regarding the denationalization of
American citizens.
37. Haile appeared before the Seventh Circuit three times. In the first
hearing, the court remanded the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA). Haile v. Gonzales (Haile I), 421 F.3d 493, 497 (7th Cir. 2005). The BIA
had failed to consider the effect of denationalization on the application for
asylum. Id. After the BIA again denied his application for asylum, Haile again 
appealed before the Seventh Circuit. Haile II, 591 F.3d at 573-74. In his last
appearance, which does not figure into this analysis, Haile successfully
petitioned the court to order the government to pay his legal and court fees
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1) (2006). Haile v. Holder, 384 F. App’x 501, 502 
(7th Cir. 2010). 
38. Haile, 591 F.3d at 574. But see  SECKLER-HUDSON, supra note 12, at 250
(stating that as a matter of international law, the cause of statelessness is
immaterial).
 39. Kerber, supra note 15, at 32.
 40. See MARIA BALDINI-POTERIM, IMMIGRATION TRIAL HANDBOOK § 6:52 (2011).
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I. STATELESSNESS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEFINING 
CITIZENSHIP UNDER JUS SOLI OR JUS SANGUINIS 
National governments determine their citizenship
requirements. Although the “form and substance varies
from state to state,” there are two basic theories of
citizenship for newly born citizens used by most states.41 
The majority of the world’s citizens are endowed with their
nationality at birth either due to their place of birth, jus
soli, or due to the nationality of their parents, jus
sanguinis. 42 The United States uses a hybrid system in
which “all persons born . . . in the United States . . . are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside,”43 and where certain foreign-born children of United
States citizens may automatically acquire citizenship.44 
Thus, the United States uses both theories of citizenship.45 
In considering the scope of the right to citizenship, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress wanted the Fourteenth
Amendment “to put citizenship beyond the power of any
governmental unit to destroy.”46 According to the Supreme
Court, once the United States government grants an
individual citizenship, that individual may only be
expatriated through his conduct and will.47 
41. Blackman, supra note 9, at 1148; David Weissbrodt & Clay Collins, The 
Human Rights of Stateless People, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 245, 254 (2006).
 42. CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 91.01(3) (2011); Milbrandt, supra note 4, at
89-91; Weissbrodt & Collins, supra note 41, at 254; Fenn, supra note 34, at
1560.
 43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
44. The Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631
(2000).
45. The use of both theories in the United States system of citizenship is
unusual when compared to many countries. Nevertheless, there are still gaps in
the system that might leave children born to Americans stateless. For a
hypothetical example, see Kerber, supra note 15, at 1-7.
46. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 263 (1967) (holding that the Congress has
no right to denationalize citizens). 
47. The court in Vance v. Terrazas stated: 
[T]he intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, among other things, was to
define citizenship; and as interpreted in Afroyim, that definition cannot
coexist with a congressional power to specify acts that work a 














   
 







     
    
   




   
  







2013] STATELESSNESS AS PERSECUTION 707
Under an exclusively jus sanguinis theory of
citizenship—an approach that is increasingly common in 
Europe—citizenship is limited to those with an ethnic or
racial tie to the country.48 Such laws, while giving
citizenship to the foreign-born children of nationals living
abroad, create statelessness amongst children born to
members of minority groups and refugees.49 Some of the
most intractable statelessness, for example that found
amongst the Roma and the Palestinians, can be traced to
the use of jus sanguinis. 50 Arguably, the most egregious 
example of ethnic persecution in the modern era, the 
Holocaust, started with the promulgation of the Reich
Citizenship Law.51 This law changed German citizenship
from a jus soli system to a jus sanguinis one; this had the 
last analysis, expatriation depends on the will of the citizen rather than 
on the will of Congress and its assessment of his conduct. 
444 U.S. 252, 260 (1980); see also Shai Lavi, Punishment and the Revocation of
Citizenship in the United Kingdom, United States, and Israel, 13 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 404, 415-16 (2010).
48. Although I am focusing on the role of jus sanguinis as a cause of
statelessness, it is not the sole cause. The United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees provided a list of ten causes of statelessness: “[C]onflict of laws;
transfer of territory; laws related to marriage; administrative practices;
discrimination; laws related to registration of births; jus sanguinis; 
denationalization; renunciation of citizenship; and automatic loss of citizenship
by operation of law.” Weissbrodt & Collins, supra note 41, at 253 (citing UNITED 
NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, INFORMATION AND ACCESSION PACKAGE:
THE 1954 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF STATELESS PERSONS AND THE
1961 CONVENTION ON THE REDUCTION OF STATELESSNESS (1999)).
 49. See Sharita Gruberg, De Facto Statelessness Among Undocumented 
Migrants in Greece, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 533, 545-46 (2011); Jessica
Parra, Stateless Roma in the European Union: Reconciling the Doctrine of
Sovereignty Concerning Nationality Laws with International Agreements to
Reduce and Avoid Statelessness, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1666, 1678-82 (2011)
(discussing the use of jus sanguinis citizenship laws in Europe that deprive the
Roma of the rights afforded most native-born people).
 50. See, e.g., Parra, supra note 49, at 1679-82; see also Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d
445, 453-55 (6th Cir. 2003) (where a Palestinian family never gained citizenship 
in Kuwait due to Kuwait’s jus sanguinis citizenship rules); Faddoul v. INS, 37
F.3d 185, 188-89 (5th Cir. 1994) (where Saudi Arabia’s denying a Palestinian
citizenship because of their use of jus sanguinis did not constitute persecution). 
51. Massey, supra note 2, at 3-4; Weis, 1961 Convention, supra note 24, at
1084.
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obvious and intended side effect of stripping German Jews
of their citizenship and its connected rights.52 
The application of jus sanguinis citizenship during state
transition can also produce large stateless populations.53 
Following the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly
independent Estonia created a legal framework requiring 
“new” Estonian citizens to trace their blood descent back to
the period prior to Soviet occupation.54 This effectively
denationalized all of the Russians living in Estonia at the 
time of independence, despite the fact that most ethnic
Russians were born in Estonia and comprised one-third of
Estonia’s total population.55 Jus sanguinis states often
compound the trauma to the newly stateless by extending 
citizenship to foreign-born ethnic nationals. For example,
Croatia refused ethnic Serbs citizenship in the 1990s
following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, but extended 
citizenship to ethnic Croats living in Bosnia.56 
If states defined citizenship solely on a jus soli theory of
citizenship, then statelessness would not be a problem.
Under such a scenario, all of the perpetually stateless 
groups mentioned above would merely be citizens of the
state of their birth. If Croatia or Estonia had adopted a jus
soli rationale in promulgating their citizenship laws, then
the Serbs and Russians would have automatically received 
Croatian and Estonian citizenship upon the creation of 
these states. Sadly this was not the case. Despite the
integration of European states because of the European
52. See Massey, supra note 2, at 3-4; Blitz & Lynch, supra note 4, at 8.
53. UNHCR Int’l Prot., supra note 19, at 307. The process of transferring
territory from one state to another, dividing territory into two or more states, or
dissolving a pre-existing state into multiple new states often results in 
individuals losing their citizenship without gaining a new one. Id.
 54. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2009, at 205 (2009); 
Richard C. Visek, Creating the Ethnic Electorate Through Legal Restorationism: 
Citizenship Rights in Estonia, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 315, 315-16, 346-47 (1997); see 
also Marc Holzapfel, Note, The Implications of Human Rights Abuses Currently
Occurring in the Baltic States Against the Ethnic Russian National Minority, 2
BUFF. J. INT’L L. 329, 356-59 (1996) (giving a history of the conflict between
ethnic minority Russians and the dominant ethnic groups in the Baltic 
Republics).
 55. Visek, supra note 54, at 315, 322.

























    





2013] STATELESSNESS AS PERSECUTION 709
Union, European countries are increasingly defining their
citizenry in terms of jus sanguinis and not jus soli. 57 
So far I have only discussed statelessness springing 
from the function of law, or de jure statelessness.58 It is 
worth mentioning that this group of stateless differs
significantly from the de facto stateless. The latter group
consists of those who because of war, discrimination, or 
other calamity lack an effective nationality.59 These
individuals still have a citizenship, but it has been rendered
ineffectual because of conditions.60 The conditions that 
create de facto statelessness often include persecution 
because of race, religion, nationality, or civil strife.61 
Because of this, the de facto stateless have an advantage in
claiming asylum under United States law which requires
the applicant to have a “well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, [or] nationality.”62 The resulting 
divergent treatment of the two groups would not be allowed
had the United States acceded to the 1954 and 1961
Conventions—each Convention recommended that states
treat the de facto and de jure stateless the same.63 
The international regime to protect the stateless and
reduce statelessness is not limited to the 1954 and 1961
Conventions. As mentioned above, the U.N. created the 
UNHCR to oversee care of the de facto stateless.64 
Additionally, a variety of other instruments were created
during this period to protect the rights of the stateless.65 
These agreements, coupled with the various multi-national 
and regional treaties, have created a wide-ranging
57. Sawyer, supra note 13, at 106.
 58. See, e.g., UNHCR Int’l Prot., supra note 19, at 300. 
59. Milbrandt, supra note 4, at 82. 
60. Id. 
61. See Batchelor, supra note 9, at 232-33.
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). 
63. See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GUIDELINES ON STATELESSNESS NO.
2: PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL IS A STATELESS
PERSON ¶¶ 70-71 (Apr. 5, 2012).
 64. See UNHCR, supra note 23.
 65. See UNHCR Int’l Prot., supra note 19, at 300-01 (listing a range of the
U.N. declarations, conventions, and agreements designed to protect the human
rights of the stateless). 
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international system with the goal of reducing and 
eliminating statelessness.66 Despite the sustained effort
made by generations of diplomats to address these issues 
(concern about statelessness stretches back at least to the
League of Nations, if not before), none of these conventions 
provides the stateless with real recourse.67 Because
“relatively few provisions of international law are directly 
enforceable, especially at the instigation of individuals,” the 
stateless can only hope to embarrass states if they fail to
meet their international obligations.68 Even this recourse
assumes that the country in which the stateless reside is a
signatory to these assorted conventions (relatively few have
signed on to either the 195469 or the 1961 Convention70), and
that the stateless possesses the capacity to shame said
nation (a tall order considering the relatively trodden-on
state of most stateless). As mentioned before, the United
States is not a signatory to many of these agreements and 
so their applicability and requirements do not control; 
however, one agreement which the United States did sign
was largely incorporated into its refugee law.71 
66. Id. at 300; see generally Batchelor, supra note 9 (containing a detailed
analysis of the scope of the international system in relation to stateless
persons); Blackman, supra note 9 (discussing the international norms of
nationality in cases of state succession).
 67. See Loewenfeld, supra note 13, at 63-65.
 68. Sawyer, supra note 13, at 75 
69. At last count, there are seventy-seven nation-states who are party to the
1954 Convention. See United Nations, Treaty Collection, 1-2 (Apr. 7, 2013),
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20V/V-
3.en.pdf. This constitutes just over 39% of the 195 countries recognized by the
United States. See Independent States in the World, U.S. DEP’T OF ST.,
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2012). 
70. The 1961 Convention has had less success than its predecessor in
attracting signatories. Fifty-one nation-states are party to it. See United 
Nations, Treaty Collection, 1-2 (Apr. 7, 2013),
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20V/V-
4.en.pdf. This constitutes 26% of the 195 countries recognized by the United
States. See U.S. DEP’T OF ST., supra note 69.
 71. See Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 123, 134 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing United
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II. GRANTING ASYLUM UNDER UNITED STATES LAW 
A. Statutory Requirements for Asylum Applicants 
The Refugee Act of 1980 codified the international
obligation the United States had contracted under the
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.72 Under the reforms, any alien present in the
United States can apply for asylum within specific 
constraints.73 As the focus of the refugee law is to provide 
relief from persecution,74 the asylum applicant has the
burden to prove that she is a refugee who suffered or will 
suffer persecution.75 She must pass a multipronged test to
prove herself a refugee. She must first show a demonstrated
unwillingness to return to her country of citizenship, or the 
country of her last habitual residence—the latter in the case
of stateless refugees.76 This unwillingness must be based
upon actual past or a fear of future persecution in that
country;77 this fear might be based on real experience of 
persecution, or a well-founded fear of future persecution.78 
In all cases, the persecution must be due to the applicant’s 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.79 For stateless individuals, the 
statute implies that the locus for the persecution must be 
the place of her “last habitual resid[ence].”80 As with most 
matters in an asylum proceeding, the designation of the
country of last habitual residence may be rebutted by the
72. Id. (discussing obligations of the United States vis-à-vis an asylum
applicant).
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2006).
 74. Fenn, supra note 34, at 1549.
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006); Asylum Procedures, 8 C.F.R. § 208.5
(2006).
76. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
 77. Id. 
78. Id.
 79. Id. The idea is that persecution renders citizens of a nation de facto
stateless insofar as they cannot exercise the rights and benefits of citizenship.
 80. Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2006); see Fenn, supra note 34, at 1550-52
(discussing the difficulty in designating the country of last habitual residence
for refugees, and the standard the court uses to determine this location).
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asylum officer or immigration judge.81 Once the applicant
has established that she is indeed a refugee, then the
Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General 
may grant her asylum.82 
Multiple difficulties exist when applying the statute to 
the stateless, especially those who have fled from one 
country to another prior to seeking asylum in the United
States. Courts must determine which state to consider the 
locus of the persecution. For example, in Paripovic v.
Gonzales the Third Circuit took up an asylum claim from a 
Serb who lived in Croatia when Yugoslavia dissolved.83 
Paripovic fled from Croatia to Serbia because of Croat 
persecution toward Serbs; he lived in a refugee camp in
Serbia for two years following his expulsion.84 This scenario
begs the question of what constitutes the “last habitual 
residence.” If Paripovic’s “last habitual residence” was in 
Croatia, then the Croatian authority’s discrimination
against him would constitute persecution.85 If, on the other
hand, his two years living in a Serbian refugee camp
constituted his “last habitual residence,” then he would 
neither have faced nor had reason to fear persecution.86 This 
determination is essential only if the court defines 
persecution in terms of physical or psychological trauma.
Denationalization qua persecution would render moot the
“last habitual residence” prong of the statute because
denationalization is a persecution that transcends national 
boundaries.
Congress provided no clear definition of the term 
“persecution” when it drafted the statute.87 The code merely 
allows that the refugee must establish a history of
persecution or “a well-founded fear of persecution.”88 This 
persecution, or fear thereof, must be due to the applicant’s
“race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
81. See Paripovic v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 240, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2005).
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
83. Paripovic, 418 F.3d at 242.
 84. Id. at 242-43.
 85. Id. at 243.
 86. Id. at 242-43.
 87. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
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social group, or political opinion.”89 The burden of proving
past or potential persecution rests with the applicant90 and
may be rebutted by a finding of the asylum officer or 
immigration judge.91 With Congress leaving the definition of
“persecution” ambiguous,92 the courts have necessarily
evaluated claims on a case-by-case basis.93 
B. Defining Persecution in United States Asylum Case Law 
Just as the facts and circumstances of each case vary, so 
will the theories used by the courts in their rulings vary
from circuit to circuit. That said, generally the courts will 
not find persecution in actions where: the state apparatus is
performing its normal function;94 the persecution springs
from the actions of private actors;95 or if the threats made
against the applicant are simple harassment.96 For example,
the Seventh Circuit denied the asylum application in
Fedosseeva because the applicant’s experiences—she had
been mugged and had her utilities shut off—failed to rise to
the level of a systematic, government-supported endeavor to 
rid Latvia of ethnic Russians.97 Instead they were mere
“unpleasant incidents.”98 Courts have found none of the
following to constitute persecution without other indicia:
compulsory military service;99 loss of employment;100 
89. Id. 
90. 8 C.F.R. § 208.5 (2006).
91. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2006).
 92. Id; see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
 93. See Fenn, supra note 34, at 1553-54; see also GERMAIN, supra note 32, at
31-33 (giving examples of various strategies the courts have taken to define
“persecution”).
 94. See, e.g., De Souza v. INS, 999 F.2d 1156, 1159 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
the performance of normal police functions does not constitute persecution).
 95. See, e.g., Hor v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 501-02 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding
that there is no basis for asylum because of persecution for acts by private
groups that are not sanctioned by the government).
96. Fedosseeva v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 840, 847 (7th Cir. 2007).
 97. Id. at 846-47.
 98. Id. at 844 (internal quotation marks omitted).
 99. See, e.g., Foroglou v. INS, 170 F.3d 68, 69, 72 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding that
compulsory military service is not persecution, despite the draftee’s objection to
it because of his belief in Ayn Rand’s Objectivism).
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menacing telephone calls;101 prosecution for evading military 
laws,102 deprivation of the right to work;103 or conscription by
guerrilla groups.104 In addition, courts have stated that 
statelessness itself is neither persecution nor grounds for 
asylum.105 
Despite applicants’ attempts to gain asylum protection 
because of these experiences, the courts have tended to 
grant asylum only for acts of a more physical nature. Severe
physical trauma, systematic genocide, torture, and slavery
all fall under the rubric of persecution.106 With the increased 
reporting of the use of rape in various conflicts, there is now 
100. See, e.g., Fedosseeva, 492 F.3d at 846-47; Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d
1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the South African state had the right
to terminate white South Africans from their jobs in order to provide jobs for
black South Africans given that country’s history).
 101. See, e.g., Sepulveda v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1232 (11th Cir.
2005) (holding that threats to the applicant and her family, including 
threatening phone calls, do not rise to the level of persecution necessary for 
asylum).
 102. See, e.g., Djedovic v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d 547, 549 (7th Cir. 2006) The court
held that an ethnic Bosnian who was conscripted by Serbian forces during the
Kosovar war did not face persecution if deported. Id. This happened despite the
fact he would assuredly be prosecuted for desertion during the war. Id.
 103. See, e.g., El Assadi v. Holder, 418 F. App’x 484, 486-87 (6th Cir. 2011)
(holding that Saudi Arabia’s laws limiting employment to women were not
persecution even though the petitioner’s employment options would be limited
following deportation there). 
104. See, e.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481-82 (1992) (holding that
fear of guerilla groups is not sufficient and does not meet the persecution based
on political belief prong to qualify for asylum).
 105. Aburuwaida v. U.S. Attorney Gen., No. 11-11068, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 
22456, at *5-6 (11th Cir. Nov. 3, 2011) (quoting Fedosseeva, 492 F.3d at 845
(stating that even the stateless must show a history of persecution in order to
establish grounds for asylum)); Maksimova v. Holder, 361 F. App’x 690, 693 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (stating that statelessness is not grounds for asylum, and that “[a]
stateless applicant must show the same well-founded fear of persecution as an
applicant with a nationality”); Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 214, 218 (3d Cir.
2003) (stating that “statelessness alone does not warrant asylum”); Faddoul v.
INS, 37 F.3d 185, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that states have a right to set 
laws determining who can attain citizenship and that statelessness itself is
insufficient grounds for asylum).





























   
 
   
  
   
2013] STATELESSNESS AS PERSECUTION 715
a presumption that it constitutes persecution.107 Severe 
economic deprivation,108 beatings,109 abusive detentions,110 
and the inability to earn a livelihood, coupled with forced 
expulsion, all qualify as persecution according to the 
courts.111 Members of minority religious communities may
qualify for asylum when their group is subject to
persecution generally, even if the individual seeking asylum
has not suffered any personal persecution.112 
Given this backdrop, the Seventh Circuit’s rulings in 
Haile II, and its predecessor Haile I, open the door to the
courts considering statelessness via denationalization as
persecution per se. 113 In so finding, the Seventh Circuit 
reversed course on the issue of statelessness qua
persecution and created new grounds for asylum.
Specifically, this ruling opened the possibility that United
States courts will consider the denationalization of foreign
citizens by sovereign powers as persecution per se if the 
denationalization springs from issues of ethnicity. 
107. See Shoafera v. INS, No. 98-70565, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31361, at *12-
15 (9th Cir. Sept. 7, 2000) (holding that the victim was raped because of her
ethnicity and that this act constituted persecution); see also Tanya Domenica
Bosi, Yadegar-Sargis v. INS: Unveiling the Discriminatory World of U.S. Asylum 
Laws: The Necessity to Recognize a Gender Category, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 777,
778-80 (2004) (discussing the need to expand current asylum laws to provide 
greater protection for women seeking asylum). But see Suketu Mehta, The 
Asylum Seeker, NEW YORKER, Aug. 1, 2011, at 32. 
108. See, e.g., Koval v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 798, 806 (7th Cir. 2005) (granting
asylum to a Ukrainian Mormon couple that had been denied work
commensurate with their education because of their faith).
 109. See, e.g., Montoya-Ulloa v. INS, 79 F.3d 930, 931 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a man beaten by a government-supported Sandinista gang is eligible for 
asylum because the beating stemmed from his political opinions).
110. Phommasoukha v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding
that the government’s abusive detention of the prisoner in a concentration camp
constituted persecution). 
111. See, e.g., Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 448-49, 453-55 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the petitioner’s family, stateless Palestinians, faced persecution
when they were forced to abandon their business, faced physical persecution in
Kuwait after the First Gulf War, and had to flee to Bulgaria).
112. Sahi v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 587, 589 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
persecution of the Ahmadi religious sect in Pakistan constituted sufficient
grounds for the petitioner to have a fear of persecution if returned to Pakistan).
113. Haile v. Holder (Haile II), 591 F.3d 572, 574-75 (7th Cir. 2010); Haile v.
Gonzales (Haile I), 421 F.3d 493, 495-96 (7th Cir. 2005).
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III. STATELESSNESS AS PER SE PERSECUTION—HAILE V. 
GONZALES AND HAILE V. HOLDER 
An understanding of the history of Eritrea and Ethiopia
is necessary to frame the two Haile cases. Following World
War II, the two countries were joined by a United Nations
resolution.114 Although nominally self-governing, Eritrea’s
hopes for post-war independence came to naught.115 In 1962,
Ethiopian emperor Haile Sellassie dissolved the Eritrean
parliament unilaterally and annexed the country into 
Ethiopia, a situation that continued following the 1974
Ethiopian military junta that ended Sellassie’s reign.116 As a
result, Eritrean rebels sought an independent state during
a thirty-year civil war between the two sides.117 Eritrea
finally gained its independence after a 1993 plebiscite.118 
This did not end hostilities between the two sides.119 The 
nations fought a three-year border war from 1998–2000.120 
This war included the indiscriminate expulsion from
Ethiopia of “some 75,000 Ethiopian citizens of Eritrean 
ethnicity.”121 Since 2006, Eritrea has provided arms to
ethnic Somalis resisting Ethiopian rule.122 Despite the
violence, the historical interconnectedness has resulted in
many ethnic Eritreans living and working in Ethiopia.123 
The life of Temesgen Haile, the asylum applicant in 
these two cases, mirrors the history of these two belligerent
114. Eritrea, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, (Jan. 20, 2012),
http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/eritrea/194937.htm.
 115. Id.
 116. Id. 
117. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF ST., 




 120. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 54, at 211. 
121. Haile v. Holder (Haile II), 591 F.3d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing The 
Horn of Africa War, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 29, 2003),
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/12364/section/1). Milbrandt puts the number at
70,000. Milbrandt, supra note 4, at 95.
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nations. He was born in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa
in 1976 at a time when Eritrea was still part of Ethiopia
and the civil war was ongoing.124 His parents were
Ethiopian citizens of Eritrean descent; under the Ethiopian 
laws at the time, Haile received Ethiopian citizenship at
birth.125 After the plebiscite for Eritrean independence,
Haile’s parents moved from Ethiopia to Eritrea in 1992126 
and became Eritrean citizens upon independence in 1993.127 
Haile stayed behind in Ethiopia despite the fact that he was
a minor.128 As mentioned before, the 1998 resumption of
hostilities produced a mass deportation of ethnic Eritreans 
from Ethiopia to Eritrea.129 Unlike many of his fellow 
Eritreans, Haile fled to Kenya in 1998 before he could be
detained by Ethiopian forces.130 He left behind his Ethiopian 
passport in his haste to escape.131 He arrived in the United
States sometime thereafter and applied for asylum.132 
Despite his circumstances, the immigration judge (I.J.) 
denied Haile’s asylum request.133 The I.J. found that Haile 
had not suffered persecution because he had fled before
Ethiopian forces could deport him to Eritrea or otherwise 
persecute him.134 The judge maintained that Haile faced no 
prospect of persecution upon return to Ethiopia because
Haile had not participated in the independence process.135 
Haile asserted that Ethiopia had rendered him effectively
stateless and would no longer recognize him as a citizen.136
 124. Haile v. Gonzalez (Haile I), 421 F.3d 493, 495 (7th Cir. 2005). 
125. Haile II, 591 F.3d at 573.
 126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. For information on contemporary Ethiopian citizenship laws, see John
R. Campbell, The Enduring Problem of Statelessness in the Horn of Africa: How
Nation-States and Western Courts (Re)Define Nationality, 23 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 
656, 658-59 (2011).
 129. Haile II, 591 F.3d at 573.
130. Haile v. Gonzales (Haile I), 421 F.3d 493, 495 (7th Cir. 2005). 
131. Id. at 495.
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The I.J. dismissed this claim as irrelevant.137 Instead, the
I.J. relied on the notion that all states have the right to
determine citizenship rules and to denationalize their 
citizens as they see fit.138 The Board of Immigration Appeals
affirmed without comment.139 
The first time Haile appeared before the Seventh
Circuit, the court found it problematic that a nation could 
merely divest its citizens of their citizenship without such 
an act falling into the definition of persecution.140 Judge
Rovner, who wrote for the court, pointed out that the I.J.’s 
holding depended upon authority from Faddoul141 and De
Souza, 142 wherein the courts held that the denial of
citizenship was not persecution.143 These two decisions dealt
with de jure stateless individuals who had never held legal 
citizenship.144 By contrast, Haile held Ethiopian citizenship
at the time of the war’s outbreak.145 Judge Rovner concluded
that there was nothing in the case law to suggest that a
sovereign possesses the “right to strip citizenship from a 
class of persons based on their ethnicity.”146 
Having brought into question the right of states to
denationalize their citizens, the court next turned to
whether such divestment constituted persecution per se. 147 
Judge Rovner concluded that not only was a “program of
denationalization and deportation” persecution, but that
137. Id.
138. Haile v. Holder (Haile II), 591 F.3d, 572, 573 (7th Cir. 2010). 
139. Haile I, 421 F.3d at 495.
 140. Id. at 496.
141. Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1994). Faddoul involved an
application of a stateless Palestinian claiming asylum from Saudi Arabia. Id. at
187-88. The court stated that it would not find citizenship by jus sanguinis as 
persecution per se and that statelessness without more is not persecution. Id. at
188-89.
142. De Souza v. INS, 999 F.2d 1156, 1159 (7th Cir. 1993) (denying the asylum
request of a stateless ethnic Indian born in Kenya where the asylum stemmed 
largely from Kenya’s denial of the petitioner’s citizenship request).
 143. Haile II, 591 F.3d at 574; Haile I, 421 F.3d at 496.
 144. Haile I, 421 F.3d at 496.
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such programs almost invariably constitute, or are
“precursor[s] to even worse things.”148 The court compared
the use of denationalization as a “political weapon” in Africa 
with “the Reich Citizenship Law of 1935, which stripped 
German Jews of their citizenship.”149 In so doing, the court
strongly implied that divesting individuals of their 
citizenship constituted persecution and that the Board of
Immigration Appeals should consider this upon remand.150 
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Haile
asylum when it reconsidered the matter on remand.151 The 
Board failed to take the hint offered by the Seventh Circuit 
and ruled that courts must weigh the totality of the
circumstances in determining if an asylum-applicant
experienced persecution.152 The BIA felt that even though
“denationalization can be a harbinger of persecution,” 
without further action, it does not meet the definition of 
persecution under United States law.153 The BIA also held 
that even if the state denationalized the asylum-applicant
because of a statutorily “protected ground,” this still would 
not amount to persecution.154 Based upon this logic the BIA
rejected Haile’s application for asylum for a second time.155 
The Seventh Circuit reversed the BIA again; this time
Judge Posner wrote for the court.156 Although he agreed 
with the BIA’s assessment that not “all denationalizations
are instances of persecution,” Posner disagreed with the
logic used by the BIA’s counsel.157 The BIA’s counsel argued 
that denationalization can never be persecution without
148. Id. (internal citation omitted).
 149. Id. (citing LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS, 1933–1945,
at 67-69 (1975)); Open Society Justice Initiative, Statelessness, Discrimination 
and Denationalization: Emerging Problems Requiring Action, Statement to the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Apr. 29, 2005).
 150. Haile I, 421 F.3d at 496-97.
151. Haile v. Holder (Haile II), 591 F.3d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 2010).
 152. Id.
 153. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
154. Id. at 573-74 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
155. Id. at 573.
 156. Id. at 575-76.
 157. Id. at 573.
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additional overt acts.158 This position was supported by
years of American jurisprudence that rejected asylum 
claims based solely on the statelessness of the applicant.159 
During the hearing, the judges of the Seventh Circuit asked 
the BIA’s attorney whether its argument would support the
notion that the United States would have legal justification
to denationalize all American-Muslims following the 9/11
terrorist attacks.160 Much to the chagrin of the court, the
BIA attorney responded in the affirmative.161 The court 
concluded that the BIA’s “denationalization plus” 
requirement to prove persecution was untenable.162 The 
court concluded that under the BIA’s logic, the United 
States would not have had grounds to grant asylum for
Jewish applicants after the Reich’s Nuremberg Laws 
divested them of their citizenship.163 The obvious absurdity
of this position leads to the conclusion that
denationalization, while it may also be a predicate to more 
blatant acts of persecution, is persecution in itself.164 The 
experience of the Jews in Nazi Germany shows that 
denationalization can justify a multitude of harmful, but 
legal, acts against a discrete population of ethnic or 
religious minorities.165 The court then concluded that Haile’s
denationalization constituted persecution, absent reasons to 
the contrary offered by the BIA.166 
A. Analysis-Implication of Haile I and Haile II in Current 
Jurisprudence Regarding Stateless Refugees 
As should be clear, the Seventh Circuit took a step away
from the established jurisprudence regarding
denationalized stateless refugees in the Haile cases.167 As 
158. Id. at 574.
 159. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
160. Haile II, 591 F.3d at 574.
 161. Id. 
162. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
163. Id. 
164. Id.
 165. Id. 
166. Id. at 574-75.
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discussed earlier, courts had up to that point almost
universally rejected the idea that any form of statelessness 
could constitute persecution.168 By showing that Ethiopia 
used denationalization as a weapon against Haile, the
Seventh Circuit turned to the view of denationalization that
Chief Justice Warren expressed in Trop—where he 
described the use of denationalization as a weapon or
punishment that is worse than torture.169 The Seventh
Circuit circumscribed its analysis to denationalization that
occurs to disadvantage a specific group of a given state’s
citizenry.170 By circumscribing the Haile II ruling as it did,
the Seventh Circuit’s holding will only reach those cases
dealing with applicants whose right of citizenship has been 
infringed upon by their country of origin.171 Ergo, this will 
not open the floodgates for all the world’s stateless to seek
asylum in the United States.172 
Two weeks after Haile II, the Sixth Circuit took a case
with a similar fact pattern in Maksimova v. Holder, but
with a different outcome.173 Maksimova was a Russian Jew 
living in Estonia at the time of the Soviet collapse.174 With
independence, Estonian policymakers revived the 1938
citizenship laws that were in place prior to the Soviet
occupation and annexation.175 During the Soviet period,
citizenship vested in the individual constituent republics 
and not the U.S.S.R.; thus, a citizen living in Estonia would
be citizen of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic.176 By
returning to the pre-annexation laws, the Estonian 
168. See, e.g., Fedosseeva v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 2007); Al-
Fara v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 733, 739 (3d Cir. 2005); Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185,
190 (5th Cir. 1994); De Souza v. INS, 999 F.2d 1156, 1159 (7th Cir. 1993).
 169. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958); Haile II, 591 F.3d at 573.
 170. Haile II, 591 F.3d at 574 (discussing how both the Third Reich and 
contemporary African nation-states have used denationalization as a form of
persecution).
 171. See Holzapfel, supra note 54, at 332-33 (discussing the fear of ethnic
minorities that their rights will be infringed on by the majority of the
population). 
172. Cf. Al-Fara, 404 F.3d at 739.
173. Maksimova v. Holder, 361 F. App’x. 690, 693 (6th Cir. 2010).
 174. Id. at 691.
 175. Visek, supra note 54, at 332.
176. Stserba v. Holder, 646 F.3d 964, 975 n.6 (6th Cir. 2011).
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government attempted to reinvigorate Estonian nationality;
these policies rendered the 400,000 Russians living in
Estonia stateless, including Maksimova.177 Despite the
obvious intent on the part of the Estonian government to
target the Russian minority, the I.J., BIA, and Sixth Circuit 
all agreed that Maksimova failed to show that Estonian 
policy divesting her of citizenship constituted persecution.178 
Applying the pre-Haile II standard, the Sixth Circuit 
concluded that statelessness alone is an insufficient ground 
to grant asylum.179 
If the principles of Haile II had applied to the facts of
this case, then the outcome would have been much different.
Estonia had denationalized Maksimova by setting stringent
language and ethnic qualifications as part of their post-
independence citizenship requirements.180 As mentioned 
above, these policies succeeded in divesting nearly all of
Estonia’s ethnic Russian population of the citizenship they
had inherited from the Soviet era.181 A similar ethnic 
animus motivated Ethiopia’s denationalization policy of
Eritreans living in Ethiopia following partition according to
the Seventh Circuit.182 If in these cases, as well as the
historic example of the Jews during the Third Reich, the 
denationalization is motivated by ethnic, political, or
religious affiliation, and the denationalization policy has a
goal of persecuting one group while benefiting anther, then, 
according to Posner’s logic, denationalization is prima facie
persecution. Ethiopia, Estonia, and Nazi Germany each set 
a policy to remove the recourse that a normal citizen would 
have against further government discrimination.
Accordingly, had the BIA accepted that denationalization is
persecution, it should have granted Maksimova asylum.
177. See Maksimova, 361 F. App’x at 693; Stserba, 646 F.3d at 975.; see also
Brad K. Blitz & Caroline Sawyer, Analysis: The Practical and Legal Realities of
Statelessness in the European Union, in STATELESSNESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
DISPLACED, UNDOCUMENTED, UNWANTED 281, 287-88 (Caroline Sawyer & Brad
K. Blitz eds., 2011) (discussing stateless Russians in Estonia); Holzapfel, supra
note 54, at 356-57.
 178. Maksimova, 361 F. App’x 690, 692-93 (6th Cir. 2010).
 179. Id. at 693.
 180. Id. at 691-92; Visek, supra note 54, at 332-342.
 181. Visek, supra note 54, at 332.
182. Haile v. Holder (Haile II), 591 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2010).
  






























2013] STATELESSNESS AS PERSECUTION 723
A year later in Stserba v. Holder, 183 the Sixth Circuit 
reversed course and applied Haile II to a fact pattern almost
identical to Maksimova. This is the only case in any Circuit
applying the Haile court’s holding that denationalization
constitutes persecution per se to date.184 As in Maksimova,
the court reviewed the case of an ethnic Russian living in 
Estonia.185 Stserba held an “Estonian” citizenship from the 
Soviet period like many of his fellow Russians in Estonia,
but post-independence Estonian policies resulted in his 
denationalization.186 Unlike in Maksimova, the Sixth Circuit 
applied the logic of Haile II. 187 The court found that Estonia 
purposely designed its citizenship laws to strip ethnic 
Russians of the citizenship rights they held in the Estonia
Soviet Socialist Republic prior to independence.188 In other 
words, the applicant “did not switch citizenship due to the
dissolution of her country of prior citizenship or as an
incident of changed boundaries. Rather, she was an
Estonian citizen who was stripped of citizenship and
became stateless.”189 As was the case with Haile and the 
German Jews under the Nuremberg laws, the Estonian 
government used denationalization as a way of
discriminating against Stserba because of her ethnicity.190 
Because the denationalization was obviously motivated by
ethnic considerations, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case
to review if the petitioner’s statelessness was of sufficient 
duration to qualify as “persecution” under the statute.191 
The Sixth Circuit’s El Assadi v. Holder shows the limits
of Haile’s statelessness qua persecution. El Assadi, a 
Palestinian refugee, was born and raised in Saudi Arabia.192 
Whereas both Haile and Stserba were born with a 
183. 646 F.3d 964 (6th Cir. 2011). 
184. Id. at 974-75.
 185. Id. at 269-71; see supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
 186. Stserba, 646 F.3d at 974-75.
 187. Id. at 974-75 (indicating that the Estonian laws were designed purposely
to disadvantage Russian minorities in meeting the citizenship requirements).
 188. Id. at 974-75.
 189. Id. at 975.
 190. Id. at 973, 976. 
191. Id.
192. El Assadi v. Holder, 418 F. App’x 484, 485 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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citizenship, El Assadi never possessed a citizenship of any 
kind.193 Saudi Arabia uses a jus sanguinis rule of
citizenship, thus disqualifying her of any claim to Saudi 
citizenship.194 El Assadi was de jure stateless from birth.195 
The perpetual failures to create a Palestinian state since
1948 have rendered most Palestinians part of that group of
peoples with no nation-state to call their own.196 Thus, they
have no political entity that can confer upon them a legally
enforceable Palestinian citizenship.197 As such, El Assadi 
could not claim her statelessness was a result of persecutory
denationalization, and the court did not consider 
statelessness alone as sufficient grounds for her asylum 
claim.198 
The distinction between the withdrawal of a pre-
existing citizenship and the nonexistence of any pre-existing
citizenship holds the key in understanding the applicability
of Haile II. The circuit courts did not want to throw open
the flood gates of asylum to every stateless individual.
Instead, Haile II stands for the possibility that those who 
have their citizenship stripped from them due to ethnicity
or some other protected class, and thus become de jure
stateless, will be able to successfully apply for asylum 
protection. This is because the withdrawal of citizenship in 
such a manner is persecution per se. This holding reinforces 
the interest in protecting those who suffered persecution by 
being expelled from “a community willing and able to
guarantee any rights whatsoever.”199 
IV. HAILE AND SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON 
DENATIONALIZATION 
Justice Posner’s decision applies the same reasoning to 
asylum law that the United States Supreme Court used to
 193. Id.
 194. See Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 189 n.3 (5th Cir. 1994).
 195. See El Assadi, 418 F. App’x at 485.
 196. Faddoul, 37 F.3d at 189-90.
 197. Id.
 198. El Assadi, 418 F. App’x at 486-87.
199. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 161 (1963) (quoting
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 294 (1951)) (internal
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prohibit the practice of Congressional denationalization.
This is a connection that the Seventh Circuit did not make
in Haile II. However, the Sixth Circuit decision in Stserba
bridged the gap by connecting the holding in Haile II with 
the established Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding 
denationalization.200 It is important to give a brief history of
the Supreme Court’s treatment of denationalization in order 
to fully understand how Haile and Stserba bring the
question under asylum law of denationalization qua
persecution in line with Supreme Court’s view of 
denationalization and statelessness. 
The right of the government to denationalize American
citizens has always been hotly debated in the halls of
Congress. Congress considered and rejected three pieces of
denationalization legislation between 1794 and 1865.201 It 
was only in 1865 that Congress passed an act that “was 
later viewed as the first denationalization statute.”202 More
denationalization laws followed.203 The common current in
these laws was that certain behavior justified the use of 
denationalization as punishment.204 Often these laws
justified stripping an individual of her citizenship based on 
the idea that the prescribed behavior amounted to an 
affirmative abandonment of American citizenship.205 Put in 
other terms, the laws were justified under the idea that the
individual’s behavior amounted to expatriation.206 It was the 
use of denationalization as punishment that provoked the 
passionate response of Chief Justice Warren in Trop v.
Dulles. 207 
Chief Justice Warren wrote for the Court’s plurality in
Trop v. Dulles and overruled the denationalization of an 
army private who deserted during the North African
200. See Stserba v. Holder, 646 F.3d 964, 973-74 (6th Cir. 2011).
 201. Spectar, supra note 8, at 280-81.
 202. Id. at 281.
 203. Id.
 204. Id. at 281-82.
 205. Id.
 206. J.P. Jones, Comment, Limiting Congressional Denationalization After 
Afroyim, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 121, 130-32 (1979). Expatriation is the process
whereby an individual renounces or otherwise rejects her citizenship.
207. 356 U.S. 86, 94 (1958). 
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campaign in World War II.208 The law at the time allowed
for denationalization as a punishment for desertion.209 Chief
Justice Warren denounced the law stating that “the
deprivation of citizenship is not a weapon that the
Government may use to express its displeasure at a citizen’s 
conduct, however reprehensible that conduct may be.”210 
Because Congress designed the denationalization to 
penalize bad behavior,211 and because the Court considered
denationalization to be “a form of punishment more 
primitive than torture,”212 the Court held that 
denationalization violated the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments.”213 
The Court revisited the issue of denationalization in a
1963 decision also dealing with military service, Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez. 214 The Court reviewed the cases of two
individuals who fled the United States in order to avoid 
service in World War II.215 An earlier law passed by
Congress allowed for the denationalization of individuals 
leaving or remaining outside of the United States during a
time of war “for the purpose of evading or avoiding training
and service” in the military.216 The statute automatically 
stripped an American avoiding his military obligations of 
“his citizenship, with concomitant deprivation ‘of all that
makes life worth living.’”217 Just like in Trop, the Court
found that the divesture of citizenship was designed as a
punitive measure and a violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments.”218 
208. Id. at 87-88.
 209. Id. at 92-93.
 210. Id.
 211. See id. at 97-99.
 212. Id. at 101.
 213. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
214. 372 U.S. 144, 147-48 (1963).
 215. Id.
 216. Id. at 146 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
217. Id. at 166 (citation omitted).
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This line of cases culminated in the 1966 decision in 
Afroyim v. Rusk. 219 Unlike the punitive statutes at issue in 
Trop and Mendoza-Martinez, this case addressed the 
question of whether Congress can designate specific acts
that will automatically result in denationalization.220 The 
law in question provided that an American citizen would 
automatically lose his citizenship upon voting in the
election of a foreign state.221 Afroyim voted in the 1951
Israeli Knesset election and upon applying to renew his
American passport was refused on the grounds that his vote
amounted to a voluntary relinquishment of his 
citizenship.222 After going through a history of
denationalization and expatriation laws, the Court found 
that the Fourteenth Amendment held supreme and that 
Congress lacked the power to strip an individual of his 
citizenship.223 Justice Black stated that “[c]itizenship is no
light trifle to be jeopardized any moment Congress decides
to do so.”224 Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Afroyim, 225 
it has become an article of faith in United States domestic 
law that Congress lacks the legal authority to unilaterally
denationalize American citizens.226 The Fourteenth 
Amendment “was designed to, and does, protect every
citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible
destruction of his citizenship.”227 
The Afroyim Court also looked to the ideas of civic-
republicanism to justify the prohibition against
219. 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 
220. See id. at 256.
 221. Id. at 254. The law was codified at 8 U.S.C. § 801(e) (1946) (repealed 
1952).
 222. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 254. 
223. See id. at 267-68.
 224. Id.
 225. Id. at 267.
 226. Elwin Griffith, Expatriation and the American Citizen, 31 HOW. L.J. 454,
468-70 (1988); see also Lavi, supra note 47, at 415. However, the issue of
unilateral denationalization has come up several times since, most recently in
the context of United States citizens fighting with Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
See Nora Graham, Note, Patriot Act II and Denationalization: An 
Unconstitutional Attempt to Revive Stripping Americans of Their Citizenship, 52
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 593, 605-07 (2004).
 227. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268. 
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denationalization: “The very nature of our free government
makes it completely incongruous to have a rule of law under 
which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive 
another group of citizens of their citizenship.”228 Even
though Afroyim was based on Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence and not the Eighth Amendment like Trop, the
effect is the same; citizenship is a right that cannot be 
stripped by the state. This conclusion ties directly to the 
question in asylum law of whether a foreign power 
persecutes its population by use of denationalization.
Certainly, the Supreme Court puts a heavy premium on
American citizenship, but underlying all of the rhetoric is
the idea that once an individual is a citizen of a nation, the 
rights inherent in that citizenship are inalienable. When a 
government strips that citizen of “the right to have
rights,”229 that government has started the process of
persecuting its now-former citizen. 
CONCLUSION 
That is not to say that individuals cannot expatriate
themselves. The United States long ago abandoned the 
common law prohibition against expatriation and accepted
the right of individuals to relinquish their citizenship.230 As 
Justice White stated in Vance v. Terrazas, “expatriation
depends on the will of the citizen rather than on the will of
Congress and its assessment of [the citizen’s] conduct.”231 
Thus, whether or not an individual remains a citizen rests 
squarely on the shoulders of that individual, and not the
government of the state in which they live. 
This does not mean that citizenship is immutable; as we
have seen, state succession, renunciation, and dissolution of
a state can change an individual’s citizenship. Short of any
of these circumstances, a citizen has a “right to remain a
citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes 
that citizenship.”232 The value the Supreme Court has placed
228. Id. 
229. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
 230. See Jones, supra note 206, at 123-27.
231. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 260 (1980).
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on citizenship cannot be denied.233 Perhaps the Court’s view
stems from American Particularism; however, it seems
equally likely that the High Court considers citizenship as a
fundamental right.234 The fact that the Supreme Court has 
consistently rejected the effort to use denationalization as a
punishment supports this latter interpretation. 
In the realm of refugee law, the BIA and the circuit 
courts have largely undervalued the importance of
citizenship despite the importance the Supreme Court has
placed on it in terms of America’s denationalization laws. 
Instead of viewing citizenship as Chief Justice Earl Warren
did, these courts have largely dismissed claims of 
statelessness as irrelevant in determining if an asylum
applicant suffered persecution. In contrast, the Supreme
Court has protected citizenship as the most important 
bundle of rights available.235 
Haile II not only breaks from decades of understating 
the harms posed by denationalization as a type of 
persecution, but it also brings the logic of the Supreme
Court regarding citizenship to bear on the question of
statelessness qua persecution. Prior rulings that focused
solely on the physical manifestations of persecution missed
the most telling historical analogue of issues of
denationalization, the Jews of Nazi Germany. Nazi
Germany used the denationalizing Nuremberg Laws as the 
first step in the Holocaust. Once faced with this apt
analogy, there is no question that denationalization 
constitutes persecution. Further, the Haile II decision 
reconciles the disparity between the Supreme Court’s view
of the importance of citizenship and the lower courts’
unwillingness to protect those who have had their
citizenship stripped from them. 
233. See Batchelor, supra note 9, at 235.
 234. See  SECKLER-HUDSON, supra note 12, at 248 (quoting Thomas Jefferson:
“Every man has a right to live somewhere on the earth”). 
235. As a side note, it’s interesting that the laws in question in both Trop and
Mendoza-Martinez included the death penalty and denationalization as possible
punishment. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 172-74 (1963);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 98-99 (1958). It was the threat of denationalization
that the Court found a violation of the Eighth amendment. See supra notes 207-
17 and accompanying text. This should provide some perspective on the
importance the Supreme Court puts on citizenship. 
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While it expands protections, the limitations of Haile II
are well thought out. The international community’s 
concern for the stateless is well-founded, but it is not the job
of the United States government to protect all of the 
stateless. Given America’s already strapped immigration
infrastructure, a declaration by the Sixth Circuit that all 
statelessness constituted persecution could potentially open
the floodgates to asylum seekers. It would create a
precedent that would likely overwhelm the system and lead
to short-cut asylums through citizenship renunciations.236 
Instead, by extending the definition of persecution to those 
stateless individuals who have had their citizenship
stripped from them, the Sixth Circuit created a workable
definition of persecution that reconciles United States 
asylum law with the value that the Supreme Court has
placed on citizenship.
236. Cf. Mehta, supra note 107, at 32-37.
